Abstract-This letter investigates the secrecy performance in visible light communication (VLC) in the presence of randomly located colluding eavesdroppers (EDs). Colluding EDs can combine their observations and degrade the secrecy performance of the VLC systems. Utilizing the numerical inversion of a characteristic function, the probability distribution of the combined signal-to-noise ratio of colluding EDs is analyzed. The closedform expression of the secrecy outage probability is derived and verified by Monte Carlo simulations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
V ISIBLE Light Communication (VLC) systems have gained great popularity among researchers and engineers as a possible solution for offloading the high traffic from the capacity-stressed macrocells in future networks. VLC is an enabling technology that uses visible light as its communication medium and exploits the light infrastructure currently being used for illumination to provide high-speed indoor wireless communication [1] .
Since visible light cannot penetrate an opaque wall, a VLC system can offer high security at the physical layer. However, in large rooms, such as offices, libraries, and shopping malls, there is always the possibility that an eavesdropper (ED) can wiretap the signal in the air. As one of many network security techniques, physical layer security (PLS) is a set of techniques that enable a transmitter and a legitimate receiver (UE) to securely transmit and receive important data utilizing the randomness of a channel to hide information from EDs at the cost of reducing communication rates [2] .
To secure VLC systems, many PLS techniques for VLC systems have been studied [3] - [6] . All of these works assumed a single ED or non-colluding multiple EDs. However, spatially distributed multiple EDs in a VLC system can combine their observations by various diversity combining methods and significantly improve their combined signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), which can degrade the secrecy performance of the network. Moreover, in VLC systems, the collusion among multiple EDs would be a very feasible and practical way to improve the received SNR of EDs escaping the vigilance of the UE, because the EDs can easily maintain the appearance of ordinary legitimate receivers. There have been a few studies regarding colluding EDs in radio frequency (RF) systems [7] - [9] . Pinto et al. [7] derived the stochastic expressions of the secrecy capacity in the presence of colluding EDs, and, in [8] , analyzed how ED collusion degrades the secrecy properties of the UE, in comparison to a non-colluding scenario. Chen et al. [9] proposed a transmit antenna selection and full-duplex jamming scheme to enhance secrecy performance when colluding EDs are present.
Motivated by these RF works, in this letter, we study the secrecy performance of a VLC system with randomly located colluding EDs. To the best of our knowledge, this letter is the first to model and analyze the secrecy performance of VLC systems with colluding EDs. As in [5] , to deal with the randomness of the VLC receivers, we apply a binomial point process (BPP) to model the UE location and a Poisson point process (PPP) to model the ED locations, respectively. However, contrary to [5] , where the contact distribution of a PPP is simply used to analyze the probability density of the maximum SNR of non-colluding EDs, in this letter, the Gil-Pelaez numerical inversion formula [10] is used to analyze the combined SNR of EDs. The main contributions of this letter are as follows:
• We characterize the probability density function (PDF) of the SNR of the UE and calculate the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the combined SNR of the colluding EDs by numerically evaluating the Gil-Pelaez inversion formula of a characteristic function (CF).
• We derive the closed-form expression of the secrecy outage probability (SOP) in the presence of colluding EDs that adopt the maximum ratio combining (MRC) technique.
II. SYSTEM MODEL In this letter, we consider the downlink of a VLC system as shown in Fig See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
to be randomly distributed according to a homogeneous PPP with density λ E in a circular area S with radius R. Since it may be infeasible to know the number and locations of EDs in real VLC systems, modeling the EDs using tools from stochastic geometry would provide a more practical guideline to network designers for anticipating a secure transmission with a certain density of EDs. Also, one active UE is assumed to be randomly located according to a BPP in a circular area U with radius R U (R U < R) to investigate the secrecy performance at the system level. An LED transmitter is located at the center of the ceiling, and H denotes the height of the ceiling from the work plane. All of the receivers are assumed to be located in the circular work plane. A direct-current (DC) biased pulse-amplitude modulation (PAM) VLC scheme is considered [3] , [5] . The data signal s(t) ∈ R in time slot t is superimposed on a fixed bias current I DC ∈ R + . The fixed bias I DC is used for the purpose of illumination. Thus, the transmitter's modulated signal x(t) of s(t) is a zero-mean current signal that can be expressed by x(t) = αI DC s(t), where α ∈ [0, 1] is termed the modulation index. To maintain linear current-to-light conversion, the amplitude of x(t) is constrained such that |x(t)| ≤ αI DC . Thus, the dynamic range of the LED is I DC ±αI DC . Also, since E[x(t)] = 0, the modulated signal does not affect illumination.
Therefore, the VLC channel model at the ith receiver can be written as
where h i is the channel transfer coefficient from the transmitter to the ith receiver. We allocate i = 0 to the UE and i > 0 to the EDs. n i (t) is the zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the ith receiver. As a result of collusion, EDs are assumed to use the MRC technique, which maximizes the combined SNR in VLC systems [11] . Thus, the combined signal of EDs can be written as
where ρ 2 E = i∈ E h 2 i and n E (t) = i∈ E h i n i (t). According to [12] , the channel gain h i ∈ R + in a VLC system corresponding to an LED with a generalized Lambertian emission pattern is given by
where η (W/A) is the current-to-light conversion efficiency and m = − ln(2)/ ln(cos(φ 1/2 )) is the order of Lambertian emission with half illuminance at angle φ 1/2 , and A PD is the physical area of the photodiode (PD). As shown in Fig. 1, l i is the distance between the transmitter and the ith receiver, and r i denotes the distance between the transmitter and the ith receiver in the work plane. φ i is the angle of irradiance, and ψ i is the angle of incidence. Also, κ is the refractive index of the optical concentrator at the receiver, c denotes the received field of view of the PD, R is the photodetector's responsivity, and T (V/A) is the transimpedance amplifier gain. Moreover, by assuming that a receiver's PD faces up normal to the work plane, we can rewrite (3) in terms of l i as
where as the receiver moves away from the LED; thus the receivers far from the LED can be ignored.
For the Gaussian VLC channel with amplitude constraints, it is appropriate to define the received SNR as the peak SNR since the channel capacity bounds of VLC systems are expressed as a function of the peak SNR [3] . Thus, the peak SNR at the ith receiver can be written as
where
. We use SNR to denote the peak, rather than average, SNR for the remainder of this letter. Also, the combined SNR of EDs with MRC can be defined as
The secrecy rate of the VLC channel is given by [2] C s = max
where p X is the input distribution and I(·; ·) denotes the mutual information. It is infeasible to calculate the closed-form solution for (7) due to the amplitude constraint [13] . Thus, in the following, we provide the closed-form of an achievable secrecy rate for colluding EDs. Lemma 1: An achievable secrecy rate of the Gaussian wiretap channel in (1) for colluding EDs under the assumption that MRC is used by the EDs can be obtained by lower-bounding the secrecy capacity in (7) to give
where log(·) denotes the natural logarithm.
Proof: See the Appendix. In addition, the classical SOP definition is the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity falls below a target secrecy rate [7] . However, since the closed-form of the secrecy capacity with the input amplitude constraint is also not readily available, we adopt the modified SOP for the analysis that the achievable secrecy rate R s is lower than a threshold secrecy rate R th , i.e.,
III. SECRECY ANALYSIS WITH COLLUDING EDS In this section, firstly, the probability distributions of γ 0 and γ E are calculated. Secondly, the closed-form analytical expression for the SOP is derived.
A. Probability Distributions of γ 0 and γ E
For the UE uniformly and randomly located in a circular area U with radius R U , the PDF of r 0 is f r 0 (r 0 ) = 2r 0 /R 2 U for 0 ≤ r 0 ≤ R U . The PDF of l 0 can be calculated to be
using the PDF transformation of random variables. Furthermore, once again using the transformation method, the PDF of γ 0 , i.e., the SNR of the UE, can be obtained from (5) to be
Numerically evaluating the Gil-Pelaez inversion of a CF [10] , the CDF of γ E can be calculated as
for 0 ≤ x ≤ ∞, where ϕ γ E (ω) is the CF of γ E given in (13) at the bottom of this page, K and denote the inversion parameters defined in [10] , and (x, y) denotes an upper incomplete gamma function.
Proof: The CF of γ E can be calculated as
where the closed-form expression of (12) is given in (13), shown at the bottom of this page. Here, (a) applies the probability generation functional lemma (PGFL) of the PPP [14] . Then, using the numerical inversion of the CF proposed in [10] , the CDF of γ E can be obtained as in (11).
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
According to (9) , the SOP can be written as
where ν = πe 2R th +1 /6. Then, the closed-form of (14) can be calculated in (15) IV. NUMERICAL RESULT In this section, theoretical and simulation results are given to validate our analysis. The simulation results are obtained by averaging over 10 5 independent Monte Carlo trials. We use K = 8 × 10 3 and = 2 × 10 −7 according to [10] for the numerical inversion. On a standard PC using MATLAB, the calculation can be executed in a couple of seconds. Fig. 2 shows the simulation and theoretical results for the SOP with the configuration of one BPP UE and homogeneous bounded PPP EDs as the density of EDs λ E increases. Firstly, it is obvious that the theoretical and numerical results match well, which validates our proposed analytical models. Furthermore, we note that the SOP increases as λ E increases, since increasing λ E brings more EDs, which enables them to achieve a higher SNR through collusion.
In addition, the simulation result for non-colluding PPP EDs is also given in the figure, which was investigated in [5] . In [5] , the maximum SNR of multiple EDs was considered to determine the secrecy outage. While the SOP of colluding EDs is higher than that of non-colluding EDs for the entire range of λ E , the SOP difference between colluding and non-colluding cases changes according to λ E . More specifically, for the region of λ E less than 0.01, the SOPs for the colluding and non-colluding cases are almost identical, since a single ED cannot collude alone. Note that when λ E = 0.01, the average number of EDs given the room configuration is 1.13. When λ E = 0.055, the SOP of colluding EDs with R th = 1nat/Hz/s is 0.076 higher than that of non-colluding EDs, but it decreases to 0.0082 when λ E = 0.155. This difference comes from the fact that the colluding and non-colluding EDs exploit the different types of diversity combining techniques, i.e., MRC and selective combining [16] , respectively, and each combining technique yields a different diversity gain according to the number of diversity branches, i.e., λ E πR 2 .
V. CONCLUSION In this letter, the SOP was derived as a function of the density of EDs λ E . To deal with randomly located UE and colluding EDs, we applied tools from stochastic geometry. This analysis was validated via theoretical and simulation results. Also, we verified that the collusion of EDs could degrade the secrecy performance of VLC systems, compared to the non-colluding scenario. APPENDIX PROOF OF THE LEMMA 1 A lower bound on the secrecy rate of (8) can be obtained as follows (16) where (·) and Î Ö{·} denote differential entropy and variance, respectively. (a) follows from lower-bounding (h 0 X + N 0 ) using the entropy-power inequality and upper-bounding (Y E ) using by the differential entropy of a Gaussian random variable with variance Î Ö{Y E }. Then, (b) follows from dropping the maximization by choosing a uniform distribution on p X over [ − αI DC , αI DC ]. Note that (16) is similar to [3, Th. 1], except that γ E is the sum of EDs' SNR. Also, since the upper bound of the SIMO channel is not readily available, in this letter, we only study the SOP corresponding to the achievable secrecy rate. Note that considering the lower bound of the secrecy capacity is the worst case from the secrecy perspective, which is more practical and important when engineering secure VLC systems.
